




Armed Factions' Mobilization to the Syrian Coast in March 2025

A Report Based on Open-Source Information

Introduction

This report comes to support various documentation efforts of the human rights violations and crimes committed in several locations on the Syrian coast in the period between 6 and 11 March 2025, including mass killing, looting and vandalism of private properties and degrading treatment, mainly against civilians on a sectarian basis. The events started on March 6 with coordinated attacks by groups of Assad loyalists on checkpoints and other locations of the new Syrian Army and the General Security Department, killing at least 200 government-aligned forces.¹ As a response, thousands of armed men went to the coast, including government-mobilized armed forces from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and armed civilians from all around Syria who responded to general mobilization and jihad calls from within their own communities. Over the following several days this resulted in mass killings and violations of human rights targeting mainly civilians from the Alawite minority, a religious sect of two million persons that Bashar Al-Assad belonged to. Various reports and documentation efforts put the number of victims between one and two thousand, including women, children and persons with disabilities. A government-formed investigative committee is expected to release its findings in July.

This report compiles available open-source information on various military factions and groups that mobilized to the coast during that time period, relying on open-source information collected mainly from social media sites. The report does not aim to establish attribution and responsibility of crimes, nor does it connect specific actors to incidents; it seeks however to enrich the knowledge and information collected by various human rights organizations and investigative bodies, and enhance evidence-based documentation efforts.



A map showing military factions' mobilization between 6 and 11 March 2025. Red markers are indications of locations that have been geolocated based on landmarks visible in visual materials. Yellow markers are indications of locations as mentioned in original posts without further verification. Created by Syrian Archive on July 8, 2025.

Methodology

This report was created utilizing social media posts mostly from accounts supportive of the new Damascus government found on Facebook, Telegram, and X. In other words, the videos and text posts cited here represent the narratives promoted by supporters of the armed pro-government factions themselves. While the bulk of this report focuses on the deployment of Syrian National Army (SNA) groups, it also includes groups belonging directly to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as well as those belonging to the HTS-allied National Liberation Front (NLF). However, SNA groups may be over-represented in this report as they were more likely to have pre-existing social media pages or more readily self-identify their units. This list is not meant to be a comprehensive documentation of all the groups which were deployed to the coast, but rather serve as a starting point for understanding the various groups and their areas and dates of operation. All the media



which contributed to this report has been archived and is available upon request of suitable accountability partners.*

Observations

As news of violations spread across Syria in the wake of the coordinated insurgent attacks on March 6,² many locals began to attribute crimes to units of the Syrian National Army (SNA). The SNA units referenced here are technically under the command of the Ministry of Defense. However, the integration process of these units is ongoing and many of the groups still utilize their former group names, make reference to their commanders, and display other SNA group identifiers. For example, Abu Amsha (Mohammed al-Jassem)'s faction The Suleiman Shah Division, has officially been transformed into the 62nd Division but combatants often refer to the Suleiman Shah Division or show insignia with the group's former name in their social media posts. While nearly all current SNA factions reported deployment to the coast, it is beyond the scope of this report to document any potential violations.

This report also includes information on units from at least eight divisions belonging to or seemingly affiliated with HTS or to new Ministry of Defense divisions. Some of these units were already deployed in the coast while others arrived after the insurgent attacks began. HTS's close allies, the factions of the NLF, likewise sent units or were already deployed in the coast.

Importantly, this report also documents the potentially wide-spread involvement of potentially independent or non-government-affiliated individuals and at least one example of a previously active Free Syrian Army group which appeared to re-mobilize and go to the coast. This independent mobilization also appeared to include many members of tribes and clans, particularly from the east. However it was not just "tribal" fighters who self-mobilized. This report also shows that many communities in rural Damascus sent fighters to the coast as well, either as part of pre-existing armed factions or as local community factions mobilized in the wake of the insurgent attacks.

The breadth of armed factions and civilians who went to the coast between March 6 and March 7 makes attribution for specific crimes difficult, and beyond the scope of this report. However, this report underscores two key lessons. First, the inability of the new government to control armed factions and armed individuals from self-mobilizing and committing crimes - if indeed these were independent acts - severely undermines the authority of the new state and the security of all Syrian people. Second, the obscurity of the perpetrators of these crimes only further undermines the new government, and it only emphasizes the need for the government's recently formed investigative body to provide a transparent and genuine report of what happened and hold all perpetrators to account.

* Internal referencing to Syrian Archive's system [DIWAN IDs] of all media used in this report are listed as endnotes in the end of the document.



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Syrian National Army

Al-Mu'tasim Division

On March 6 various pro-Syrian National Army Facebook pages posted that "The National Army's Al-Mu'tasim and Al-Hamza Divisions are raising their readiness and sending military reinforcements to the coast. ... The Al-Mu'tasim Division is on general military alert and preparing convoys to be sent toward the coast."³ Early morning on March 7 a video was posted on Facebook claiming to show members of al-Mu'tasim Division in Jableh in the dark with a caption criticizing the new government's "neglect" of the city.⁴

26th Division / Maghawir al-Sham Division

The Maghawir al-Sham Division was among the three SNA units referenced in a widely shared Facebook post published in the evening of March 6 announcing a mobilization to the coast, which stated "The National Army's Maghawir al-Sham Division is mobilizing its forces to eliminate remnants of the former regime's forces".⁵ A second video posted around 8am on March 7 showed a small convoy of fighters from the division, also called the 26th Division in the caption, "moving to the coast".⁶

Two videos posted on March 7 placed the unit in Hama. The first video showed a convoy of trucks driving with the caption "at dawn today from Hama to the areas of the remnants of the regime"⁷ while the second video titled "Maghawir al-Sham in Ain al-Kourum" showed a group of fighters abusing two prisoners in a building.⁸

A video published on the early morning of March 8 shows a large convoy driving through a city at night, with the man filming claiming that the group is from Zabadani and are currently in Hama City, geolocated to 35.120283, 36.739286 ([Figure 1](#)) and "on their way to the coast".⁹ A second video published by the same Zabadani Facebook page around midnight on March 8 with the caption "the mujahideen of Zabadani comb villages and mountains of coastal Syria" shows a large convoy of armed men in daytime on a highway, geolocated to 35.043040, 36.261054 ([Figure 2](#)) on the road west of Masyaf between Rasafa, Sheeha, and Raqma villages in Hama.¹⁰ A third video, posted on March 8 by a different Zabadani page, shows what appears to be the same convoy (based on the geolocated location and type of vehicles shown in each video) from a different perspective, this time explicitly labeled as belonging to the 26th Division / Maghawir al-Sham.¹¹ It therefore appears that Maghawir al-Sham was in Hama city and the Ain Kourum and Masyaf countryside between March 8 and March 9, at the latest.

A different Zabadani Facebook page posted another video late on March 8 that appears to be filmed in the same area, and showing at least one identical vehicle as the previous video, with the caption "'The mujahideen of Zabadani, with you we grow and raise our heads high.' A speech by the Mujahid Sheikh Youssef al-Tal Abu Yaqoub on



one of the fronts pursuing the remnants of the regime.”¹² Another video posted late on March 8 showed a large convoy of trucks filmed in what appears to be the evening with the caption “The Maghawir al-Sham forces participated in clearing the Syrian coast of remnants as part of the campaign launched by the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Arab Republic.”¹³

Hamza Division

The Hamza Division was the third SNA faction claimed to be moving to the coast in the widely shared late March 6 announcement of SNA mobilization.¹⁴ Just before midnight on March 6 the Facebook page for the Eastern Knights Brigade posted two videos showing nighttime convoys claimed to be “the Hamza Division Special Forces (1st Infantry Brigade)” going to Latakia from Aleppo.¹⁵

The Eastern Knights Brigade was reformed as the 1st Infantry Brigade under the Hamza Division, under the command of the Eastern Knights commander Abu Malik al-Deiri.¹⁶ While this was announced early on March 9, the group appears to have been a long-time member of the Hamza Division and the subsequent “Joint Forces,” according to reporting by Halab Today in 2024¹⁷ and a post by the Eastern Knights Facebook page in February 2025 which denied claims the group had broken from Hamza.¹⁸ A Facebook page with the name “Eastern Knights Brigade” posted a nighttime video on March 6 showing armed men mobilizing, in which the speaker claimed the 1st Brigade of the Hamza Division was moving from Aleppo to Latakia.¹⁹ The same page posted videos on March 8 of clashes claimed to be in the Jableh region and which also showed vehicles bearing the name “Jaish al-Izza”, geolocated to 35.47676, 35.89169 ([Figure 3](#)).²⁰ It is unclear if the video was simply reposted by the Eastern Knights pages or if the convoy contained both Jaish Izza and Eastern Knights members. A few hours later two additional videos claimed to be in the Qardaha region, one of which was geolocated to the international highway just south of Sanobar at 35.47064, 35.89702 ([Figure 4](#)) and the other at 35.45561, 35.90693 ([Figure 5](#)).²¹

62nd Division / Suleiman Shah

The Facebook page of the 62nd Division, formerly known as the Suleiman Shah Division, posted a video at midnight on March 6 in which Brigadier General Mohammed Al-Jassim Abu Abdul-Hay announced that their forces would move to the coast.²² That same day various pro-Suleiman Shah Facebook accounts claimed that the entire formation had deployed to the coast, including: the 103rd Brigade, 444th Brigade, Security Unit, and 102nd Brigade.²³ A nighttime picture posted early on March 8 claimed to show the commander of Suleiman Shah’s Security Unit in Jableh.²⁴

In an interview posted on March 7, Major Abu Thabet, commander of the Artillery Regiment in the 62nd Division, talks about their operations on the Tartous-Jableh highway.²⁵ Pro-SNA Telegram channels posted a video on March 7 that showed four



armed men standing amid at least ten bodies of people who appeared to have been executed, with the man filming identifying himself as a member of Suleiman Shah.²⁶

A video posted on March 8 showed another Suleiman Shah commander with a caption stating that Jableh was being “completely liberated” from Assad regime remnants, filmed at the northern entrance to the city geolocated to 35.37332, 35.92595 ([Figure 6](#)).²⁷ A video published that same day by a local community page showed a Suleiman Shah commander in the center of Ain Sharqiyeh speaking with local representatives.²⁸ A video posted on March 10 featuring the commander of the 103rd Brigade in the 62nd Division shows a man from Jableh praising the group. The caption claims that the group prevented a car robbery.²⁹

On March 9, a military commander from the unit was filmed giving a statement about the end of the operation, stating that “forces were dispatched to the coastal area to support the General Security Forces”, and that the unit “secured the M5[†] highway between Idlib and Latakia provinces, completed its mission within 18 hours, and returned to its barracks, in accordance with the instructions of the Syrian Ministry of Defense.”³⁰

70th Division / Jaish al-Islam

On March 8 pictures were posted on Facebook by various East Ghouta pages showing a group of fighters gathered around a commander with the caption: “Defense Ministry military commander Issam Boudani’s directives to fighters on one of the operational fronts on the coast before launching a campaign to pursue remnants of the former Assad regime and outlaws.”³¹ Issam Boudani is the long-time commander of Jaish al-Islam³², and was shown in pictures posted on Facebook in late March captioned “The 70th Division Command of the Ministry of Defense in the Damascus countryside held an iftar banquet for a number of its fighters, in the presence of the division’s military and administrative leadership.”³³ Boudani had also met with the Minister of Defense on March 3, in part to discuss “the Defense Ministry’s formations in Damascus and its countryside”³⁴, possibly indicating that Jaish al-Islam had already begun the process of transforming into the 70th Division by the time he arrived on the coast. It is therefore unclear if his deployment to the coast was as part of Jaish al-Islam or as part of the Ministry of Defense’s 70th Division, and whether this potential difference has any relation to the degree of direct control the Ministry of Defense had over the unit.

Ahrar Sharqiyah

On March 6 around midnight, a nighttime video was posted showing Abu Hatem Shaqra, the commander of Ahrar Shaqriyah, announcing his unit’s mobilization to the coast.³⁵ To his right was Abu Jafar Shaqra, referred to as the military commander of Ahrar

[†] Based on the location of the highway described (between Idlib and Latakia), the original poster was likely referring to the M4 highway. The reference to M5 is left as in the original source.



Sharqiyah in other posts.³⁶ The video was captioned as “The Liberation and Construction Movement”, of which Ahrar Sharqiyah is a component.³⁷

On March 7 a video filmed by an Ahrar Sharqiyah fighter named as “Sheikh Abu Al-Mish” was shared by several Facebook pages dedicated to posting news for and from specific tribes in Deir Ez Zor. The video showed a group of fighters claimed to be in Jableh, but was geolocated to 35.48692, 35.88016 ([Figure 7](#)) in Sanobar, and which appears to have been filmed at sunrise on March 7.³⁸ Another video posted late on March 7 by one of the same tribal pages posting the Jableh video shows a man who appears to be the same as “Sheikh Abu Al-Mish, and who is referenced in the caption, in an apparent coastal area carrying an armful of fruits to his vehicle along with several other armed men.³⁹ A third video posted on March 7 shows a group of Ahrar Sharqiyah fighters at nighttime, with the men in the video claiming to be in Jableh as well.⁴⁰ Tribal Facebook pages also posted ‘martyr’ announcements for men listed as being members of Ahrar Sharqiyah on March 7, though no specific coastal location was given.⁴¹

Late on March 8, a video was posted claiming to show “the military commander of Ahrar al-Sharqiyah Abu Jafar Shaqra” as he walked down a highway with fighters shooting at unidentified targets around him.⁴² The video is geolocated to 35.463906, 35.902886 ([Figure 8](#)),⁴³ placing the group on the international highway just south of Sanobar village walking south. Also on March 8 a group picture was posted showing armed men posing along the beach near Latakia city, with the caption identifying them as belonging to the Abu Saad al-Kuwayran faction of Ahrar al-Sharqiyah.⁴⁴

Two videos posted on March 8th and filmed by a man named “Suleiman al-Ajeel”, who claimed to be affiliated with Ahrar Sharqiyah, showed himself after apparently executing a family and were widely reposted (both original videos are now offline, but archived). The first video, posted around midnight, was filmed at night showing Ajeel driving a car announcing that “Ahrar Sharqiyah has arrived in Latakia.”⁴⁵ The second video was posted on Ajeel’s personal profile’s “story” section and has since been deleted, but screen recordings of the video have been shared widely. In this second video, a man, wearing the same notable clothes as Ajeel wore in the first video, walks through a living room holding a rifle while at least three people sit dead on a couch.⁴⁶

Faylaq Al-Rahman

A nighttime video posted early on March 8 showed a small group of men claiming to be from Faylaq al-Rahman’s 5th Battalion going to the coast.⁴⁷

Martyrs of Homs Brigade

A Facebook post by a self-described Jaish Izza fighter on March 8 tagged the commander of “The Martyrs of Homs Brigade,” Abu Raad Al-Homsi. The caption included, “... their reputation among their peers from the lions of Jaish Izza together, brother and comrade in arms, the military commander, commander of the Martyrs of Homs Brigade,



Abu Raad Al-Homsi, while pursuing the remnants of the regime in the Alawite villages. May God protect you, my brother, Abu Raad Al-Homsi.”⁴⁸ This likely places the brigade in the Masyaf or Wadi Ayoun countryside where Jaish Izza was known to be operating.⁴⁹

21st Division / Sultan Murad Division

Late on March 6 several pictures and videos were posted showing convoys of armed men “going to the coast”, claimed to belong to the Sultan Murad Division, also called the 21st Division.⁵⁰ On March 7 the division announced a group of ‘martyrs’ killed in Tartous Governorate.⁵¹ Several videos were also posted on March 7, likely filmed early in the morning, two of which show members of the unit inside Jableh driving from the roundabout geolocated to 35.363741, 35.938412 ([Figure 9](#)) west towards the city, and one of which shows the convoy geolocated at 35.48724, 35.87997 ([Figure 10](#)) driving south past Sanobar towards Jableh from Latakia city.⁵² Another video posted around that same time claims to show the division engaged in clashes “near the Hmeimim Airbase” along the international highway, geolocated to 35.402916, 35.933581 ([Figure 11](#)).⁵³

13th Division / Sultan Mehmed Al-Fatih Division

A video posted around midnight on March 6 showed a large convoy of trucks at night seemingly leaving a military base named after the “Sultan Mehmed al-Fatih Division, Division 13”. The video’s caption claimed they were headed to the coast⁵⁴ while other posts that night specifically said the group was going to Jableh.⁵⁵ A video posted on March 9 shows a large convoy tagged as Sultan Mehmed al-Fatih claimed to be driving through a location in the coast, as well as some clashes.⁵⁶

Jabhat al-Shamiyah

An image posted on March 6 showed nighttime mobilization of armed men claimed to be “Jabhat al-Sham and tribal factions of Manbij” going to the coast.⁵⁷ On March 7 a “martyrdom” announcement was posted for a fighter from Jabhat al-Sham, reportedly killed somewhere on the coast.⁵⁸

50th Division / Ahrar Tawheed

The 50th Division, aka Ahrar Tawheed, reportedly deployed to the coast late on March 6. At least two different videos were published on Facebook late evening on March 6 showing convoys of armed men in trucks and pickups with anti-aircraft machine guns driving in the night “towards the coast”.⁵⁹ Leaders of the 50th Division and its ally, Jabhat al-Shamiyah, had met with President al-Shara’a in mid-December.⁶⁰ The group was founded by seven component factions on December 23, 2022 as part of the SNA’s Third Corps.⁶¹



National Liberation Front

Aside from the Syrian National Army, factions from the National Liberation Front (NLF) also deployed to the coast. These groups remained in Idlib over the past years, building close ties with HTS.⁶²

Coastal Divisions

The 1st and 2nd Coastal Divisions are two NLF units largely consisting of fighters from Latakia.⁶³ On March 7, a Facebook user posted two photos of armed men in a convoy on a road that may be in the coastal areas, with the caption “The heroes of the coastal division. Don't forget them in your prayers. Sheikh Bakri Hamdou with the mujahideen to fulfill his pledge and protect the trust of the martyrs.”⁶⁴ On March 8 a pro-Damascus-government Latakia Facebook page posted a ‘martyrdom’ commemoration for a field commander in the 1st Division from Latakia city, saying “He was captured along with his comrades, but he remained steadfast until his final moments, before the hand of treachery and betrayal reached out to him. The remnants of oppression assassinated him last night.”⁶⁵ On March 9, Facebook pages posted a message saying the 1st Coastal Division was now deployed in the village of al-Hannadi, just outside the southern entrance of Latakia city, and “have secured the entire area and the people of al-Hannadi and al-Bassa villages are requested to return to their homes.”⁶⁶

Faylaq al-Sham

Faylaq al-Sham had at least some units already deployed in the coast on February 1, 2025, under a “coastal sector” commanded by “Sheikh Abu Ismail Gharir”.⁶⁷ However, videos and pictures posted by Faylaq al-Sham-affiliated Facebook users late at night on March 6 and early in the morning on March 7 appeared to show convoys traveling at night towards the coast.⁶⁸ One of the same users posted two videos several hours later apparently filmed by himself, the first posted in the morning of March 7 claiming to be in Tartous city⁶⁹ and the second posted at noon on March 7 geolocated to 35.1846, 35.94774 ([Figure 12](#)) in Baniyas city.⁷⁰

The group reported at least one ‘martyr’ in the Jableh region on March 7.⁷¹ On March 9, a civilian from the Jableh countryside posted several times on Facebook begging people to send the General Security to his house, and later wrote “Faylaq al-Sham, I will bear your debt until death. Thank God, members of Faylaq al-Sham saved us from the house before the arrival of undisciplined individuals intent on killing.”⁷²

74th Division / Jaish Izza

Jaish Izza, also known as the 74th Division⁷³, is described as being a member of the Ministry of Defense.⁷⁴ The unit is reportedly responsible for the Masyaf region⁷⁵ and as of March 7 had “checkpoints and personnel” in the north and west regions of Hama, according to a Facebook post by a local media activist.⁷⁶ This person claimed in a post



early in the morning of March 8 that, “Instructions issued by the commander of the 74th Division to the division's checkpoints and personnel in the northern and western Hama countryside: Random entry into villages and towns without coordination with the division's leadership is prohibited. Any vehicle not bearing proof of ownership will be confiscated. Entry into neighborhoods and villages with sectarian diversity will not be permitted for the purpose of revenge. Residents of villages and cities are safe as long as they adhere to the instructions and decisions of the Ministry of Defense. Strict orders will be issued to deal with anyone who violates these instructions.”⁷⁷



The image above is taken from a Facebook post published on March 6, 2025 with a caption that indicates that the 74th Division is near Wadi Ayoun in Tartous Governorate.⁷⁸ Captured by Syrian Archive on May 18, 2025.

A video posted around midnight on March 6, by a Facebook user who appears to be a member of or affiliated with Jaish Izza, showed members of the unit announcing their mobilization “to the coast.”⁷⁹ Two more videos posted by pro-Damascus-government Facebook pages a few hours before and after the mobilization video showed 1) five alleged Jaish Izza fighters standing over a body they claim was an Assad regime insurgent, posted around 9pm on March 6,⁸⁰ and 2) alleged members of the unit engaged in night fighting in and around some buildings, posted around 3am on March 7.⁸¹



Together, these two videos indicate that at least some elements of the group were engaged in combat near the beginning of the insurgency. A picture posted late on March 8 shows a convoy of “the 74th Division” at a highway intersection which appears to be on the Masyaf-Wadi Ayoun highway around 35.004910, 36.276401 ([Figure 13](#)).⁸²

A member of the unit posted a video on March 9 showing drone footage of a large convoy with the caption “entering Wadi Ayoun”.⁸³ This video was geolocated to 35.0036,36.2702 ([Figure 14](#)) north of Wadi Ayoun, just a few hundred meters down the road from the picture posted on March 8; and chronolocated to approximately 3-4pm. Another member of Jaish Izza posted two videos early in the morning on March 14, likely filmed earlier, with a long caption that included, “From here, the shackles of conferences were broken and the sound of guns rose. From here, the writing of glories began. #Lions #Jaish #Izza #Division 74. From leaders, brigades, and battalions of #Jaish #Izza fighters together, participating and coordinating with other factions from the #National Front, the #National Army, and #General Security during preparations to comb the [Wadi Al-Ayoun] area on the coast to cleanse it of the pig remnants of the regime”⁸⁴ - further placing the faction in the Wadi Ayoun region during the fighting. According to a post on March 8 from a local activist, locals in Masyaf contacted the 74th Division after a convoy arrived in their area “in order to reassure themselves” and had a friendly meeting in which the division promised to “receive the convoy and accompany it until its departure”.⁸⁵

77th Coastal Division / Brigade

The 77th Division, sometimes referred to as the 77th Brigade⁸⁶ and 77th Coastal Division⁸⁷, is a Zabadani-origin opposition faction that claims to fight as part of the Ministry of Defense.⁸⁸ Pictures of a meeting between the commander of the division, Sheikh Abu Adnan al-Zabadani, and the Minister of Defense General Abu Qasra were shared by Zabadani community Facebook pages on March 6.⁸⁹

Videos posted early in the morning of March 7 showed nighttime convoys with the caption “The heroes of Zabadani, the 77th Division of the Ministry of Defense, headed to the coastal villages to eliminate the remnants of the former regime.”⁹⁰ Photos and videos claimed to show members of the group at the University Roundabout in Latakia’s eastern entrance 35.52638, 35.8116 ([Figure 15](#)) early on March 7,⁹¹ and engaged in fighting in Latakia city’s Ogharit Neighborhood, geolocated to 35.544617, 35.790733 ([Figure 16](#)) in a video posted on March 8 referring to the previous day.⁹² Pictures and videos claiming to show the group’s members in Latakia city geolocated to 35.55966, 35.78279 ([Figure 17](#))⁹³ and the countryside continued to be posted on March 9,⁹⁴ while seemingly other units of the division were reported to have deployed⁹⁵ to the Tartous-Lebanon border on the 8th,⁹⁶ 9th,⁹⁷ and 10th.⁹⁸



The image above is taken from a Facebook post published on March 7, 2025 with a caption that places the 77th Division inside Tartous.⁹⁹ Captured by Syrian Archive on March 18, 2025.

Beginning on March 10, claims and photos began to be consistently posted placing members of the division's "Coastal Sector" in the Al-Bahluliyah district of Latakia.¹⁰⁰ A local Facebook page described the entrance of the division to Al-Bahluliyah: "On 10/3/2025 the factions in the villages of Al-Bahluliya, Da'tour Al-Bahluliya area, were burning houses and killing. Engineer Rashid Ismail informed me of this, so I contacted Mr. Abu Ahmed (M.A.A.) and literally told him, "Al-Bahluliya.. for God's sake and for you." He said to me, "consider it done." In about half an hour, 3 members of the Al-Khadhra family had been martyred, and one martyr from the Al-Jundi family. Abu Ahmed arrived with members of the 77th Brigade at the Al-Bahluliya junction. The faction said, "We will comb the village." Mr. Abu Ahmed told him, "The combing has been completed." After some back and forth, the faction left, and Mr. Abu Ahmad and the elements of Brigade 77 spared "the village" from something that would have had undesirable outcome. Now Mr. Abu Ahmed has taken over the area for us. Welcome, may God bless you. Many thanks to the members of the 77th Brigade, especially Mr. Abu Muhammad Primo and Mr. Abu Ahmed."¹⁰¹ The division remained in the Al-Bahluliyah region as of March 14, reportedly staffing checkpoints and supporting humanitarian deliveries by local organizations.¹⁰²



New Ministry of Defense Divisions

Several divisions formed after December 8 and nominally reporting directly to the Ministry of Defense also deployed to the coast. These divisions are commanded by officers from non-HTS factions, but it is not clear whether the divisions themselves are simply their factions renamed, or if they are entirely new units.

42nd Badia Division

Late evening on March 6 a Facebook post claimed that “Based on the directives of the Minister of Defense, Marhaf Abu Qasra, Major Mohammed Saeed Abdullah, Commander of the 42nd Division, is sending military reinforcements that are now heading to areas where remnants of the former regime are present to defeat them and break their power.”¹⁰³ On March 13, the Facebook page “Palmyra News Network” published a video claiming to show members of the 42nd Division in the village of Bimlaka, Tartous, with the story: “The Syrian Army Reinforces the Deployment of the “Badia” Division on the Coast. Criminal elements from the remnants of the former regime are arrested in the village of “Bimlaka” in the Tartous countryside. As part of its efforts to reinforce its security and military presence in various areas, the Syrian Army’s ‘Badia’ Division (42nd Division)—which typically specializes in securing the Syrian desert and the Palmyra region—has deployed exceptionally in the coastal province of Tartous. There, it successfully thwarted a robbery carried out by criminal elements attributed to ‘remnants of the former regime.’ The robbery targeted the homes of residents of the predominantly Christian village of “Bimlaka” in the Tartous countryside [...]. A commander in the “Badia” division confirmed to the ‘Palmyra News Network’ that ‘the division’s deployment in Tartous comes in response to a comprehensive security strategy aimed at blocking attempts by remnants of the former regime to incite chaos.’ He noted that ‘the operation was carried out by the division in close cooperation with the village’s residents, who contributed to monitoring suspicious movements.’”¹⁰⁴

54th Division

The 54th Division appears to be the new form of Ahrar al-Sham.¹⁰⁵ Late evening on March 6 a video was posted on Facebook showing a long convoy of military vehicles driving in the dark with the caption “the Elite 54 Division.”¹⁰⁶ There was no additional commentary, so it cannot be confirmed whether or not the convoy was deploying to the coast.



64th Idlib Division

The 64th Division appears to be a core unit of the Ministry of Defense. Its commander, Brigadier Muhammad Gharib (Abu Usayd) was appointed to lead the Ministry of Defense's "Idlib Division" on February 6, 2025,¹⁰⁷ later renamed the "64th Division",¹⁰⁸ coming from Faylaq al-Sham's Southern Sector.¹⁰⁹ Just before 1am on March 7, videos were posted on Facebook showing a large nighttime convoy of "the 64th Idlib Division" moving "from Mastouma to the coast."¹¹⁰ The group reported one 'martyr' killed somewhere on the coast on March 7.¹¹¹ A video posted late on March 8, which may show older footage from March 7, shows the unit firing into the dark from the international highway on the coast and claiming the division is under the command of Brigadier Abu Usayd.¹¹² On March 9, a list of 13 'martyrs' from the division "killed since March 6" in the coast was published widely on Facebook.¹¹³ Another 'martyr' was reported killed in Jisr Shoughur "a few days ago" from March 13.¹¹⁴

80th Division

Videos were posted early on March 7 showing convoys driving at night which the captions claim to belong to the 80th Division "going to the coast".¹¹⁵ On March 3 the former head of the Nour al-Din al-Zenki group,¹¹⁶ Ahmed Rizk, was appointed commander of the division.¹¹⁷

HTS Divisions

Several divisions belonging directly to HTS also deployed to the coast or were already present by March 6. These include:

103rd Division

A video posted on the morning of March 7 shows a convoy driving at night with the man filming claiming "the 103rd Division and 400th Division" are "entering the operation" - presumably driving to the coast.¹¹⁸ Specifically, the Division's Ali bin Abi Talib Brigade was claimed to deploy to the coast late on the evening of March 6.¹¹⁹ However, some units may have already been present. A picture posted on March 6 shows the commander of the 103rd Division "monitoring the combating operation on the coast."¹²⁰

118th Division

Facebook posts late on March 7 claimed that "The 118th Badia Division enters the Syrian coast to fight remnants of the ousted regime and maintain the security of the region and the safety of its residents."¹²¹ The attached pictures showed "Palmyra battalion" commander Amer Juma¹²² and division commander Raed Arab.¹²³ A late March 9



Facebook post reiterated the division's participation in the coast operations, including a picture showing some of the division's commanders.¹²⁴

128th Division

The "Elite Brigade" of HTS's 128th Division arrived on the coast by the early morning of March 7, according to one video posted on Facebook.¹²⁵ A second video posted on March 8 showed a convoy of "Elite Brigade" armored vehicles belonging to the division "preparing to pursue remnants of the regime", though it is unclear if the video predates March 8 or if this was a second unit from the division deploying to the coast.¹²⁶

400th Division

A video posted early on March 7 shows a convoy driving at night with the man filming claiming "the 103rd Division and 400th Division" are "entering the operation" - presumably driving to the coast.¹²⁷ The 400th Division had already been deployed to the coast in February,¹²⁸ with at least some units appearing to be based near the old military barracks in Latakia at 35.57487, 35.74386 ([Figure 18](#))¹²⁹, and members reportedly involved in security operations in Latakia as early as February 1.¹³⁰ A fighter from the division's Uthman bin Affan Brigade, Inghimasi Battalion, was reported killed on the coast on March 6.¹³¹ Additional 'martyrs' from the division were reported by their hometowns on Facebook as having died on March 6¹³² and March 7.¹³³ Around 4am on March 7 a Facebook post was shared widely claiming to have originally been from a member of the division's Uqba bin Nafi Brigade, saying "We have two groups besieged. One is near Qardaha, near Qabou. The other is in the heart of the helicopter airport, next to Qardaha."¹³⁴

Independent Militias

Unaffiliated militias, including some formerly established Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups, also mobilized to the coast.

A post published on March 7 and tagging a Facebook group named "the Lightning Battalions of Islam"—a group that self-describes as an Eastern Qalamoun brigade—shows a video of fighters tormenting and then shooting an unarmed man.¹³⁵ A subunit of "the Lightning Battalions of Islam" from Jayroud, seemingly in coordination with the SNA group Muntasir Billah Brigade, also announced their deployment to the coast on the early morning of March 7.¹³⁶

Other armed groups from the Zabadani region of Damascus appear to have gone to the coastal areas as well, separate from the above-mentioned 26th Division and 77th Division. On March 6, videos were posted on Facebook showing small groups of armed



men in the dark, making statements about their intentions to support the government forces. A group in Kafr Yabous announced their intention to “participate in military operations”,¹³⁷ in Madaya and in Rawdah two groups declared that they would be placing themselves under the command of the Military Operations Administration¹³⁸ “in the coast to intervene and conspire to eliminate the remnants of the former regime.”¹³⁹ All were posted at around midnight.

Local men, including a former opposition fighter, also mobilized themselves. In Latakia city, videos were posted by former opposition fighters from the city, who had returned after December 8, showing them and others including a local Imam¹⁴⁰ carrying weapons on the night of March 7 and on March 8¹⁴¹. They later claimed to have deployed with armed groups to the Slanfeh region of Latakia in a video posted on March 9 that is geolocated to 35.59753, 36.12673 ([Figure 19](#)) just west of the town.¹⁴²

In the town of Tizin, in western Hama, two different groups of armed locals, referring to themselves as “revolutionaries of Tizin”¹⁴³, posted nighttime videos on March 6 declaring their mobilization to support the besieged General Security forces¹⁴⁴ and to mobilize to the coast¹⁴⁵. A third video posted on the same Facebook page around midnight on March 6 showed large numbers of vehicles and armed men seemingly gathered at the western entrance of Hama city “preparing to go to the coast”, with the man filming them referring to them as “crowds” gathered to “support the General Security on the coast”.¹⁴⁶

Tribal Fighters

Tribe- and clan-based Facebook pages began posting their support and intention to mobilize in the early hours of the conflict. Some affiliated persons, such as members of the Al-Boushaaban tribe¹⁴⁷, Al-Buramadan tribe¹⁴⁸, and the Baggara tribe,¹⁴⁹ posted videos showing convoys ‘heading to battle’ and of funerals held in the days after for members killed “at the hands of the remnants of the regime.” Others later released videos of combat in the coast and martyrdom reports (some of which can be attributed to deaths of formal security officers and others which may have been informal combatants).¹⁵⁰ Criticism arose when a member of the Al-Boushaaban tribe posted a video in which fighters were “torturing an Alawite man and forcing him to utter words of praise for the Al-Boushaaban tribe”.¹⁵¹ In a compilation video posted by the Anabza clan page, an image appears of an anonymized armed man standing over a collection of dead bodies.¹⁵² Many posts simply reference fighters by their tribal affiliation, suggesting that *tribal fighters* (ex. a group from Baqras¹⁵³, members of the Busaraya¹⁵⁴, Baggara¹⁵⁵, and Al-Bu Asi clans¹⁵⁶) independently deployed to the coast. Others were implied to be sub-units of or affiliated with groups such as Ahrar Sharqiyah.¹⁵⁷ These militias were present in Tartous city



geolocated to 34.90209, 35.89898 ([Figure 20](#)) and 34.87002, 35.8886[‡] ([Figure 21](#))¹⁵⁸, and near the southern entrance to Latakia geolocated to 35.52036, 35.85305 ([Figure 22](#)).¹⁵⁹



The image above is taken from a Facebook post published on March 8, 2025. The caption places three commanders of tribal units in the Syrian Coast.¹⁶⁰ Captured by Syrian Archive on July 5, 2025.

Three videos posted by a Busraya Tribe Facebook page on March 7 show a large group of fighters entering Latakia via the Jisr Shoughur highway. In order of upload time, the videos show 1) the caption “starting to comb Qardaha”, geolocated to 35.45119, 35.90827 ([Figure 23](#)) facing south along the coastal highway towards the Qardaha Junction;¹⁶¹ 2) an armed convoy on the Jisr Shoughur-Latakia highway at a road sign placing them one kilometer from the Mukhtariyah exit geolocated to 35.58258, 35.94848 ([Figure 24](#)) facing towards the southern entrance to Latakia city, with the sounds of gunfire in the background, with the caption “The Lions of the Busraya Tribe from the Coastal Fronts, Abu Abdullah Al-Azami”;¹⁶² and 3) a video of combat with the caption “Abu Ismail

[‡] while the post claims to show fighters in Qardaha, it has been geolocated to 34.87002, 35.8886 on the southern outskirts of Tartous city; see Appendix A Figure 21.



Al-Sawalmeh, may your hands live long, brother of Sabha,” showing men that may be the same as seen in video 1.¹⁶³ The first video includes the caption “Don't forget us, Mayas Jarkas,” a reference to an Assad regime officer who filmed himself executing several Busraya civilians in 2017.¹⁶⁴ Within days of the Assad regime's fall, Busraya Facebook pages were threatening revenge against Jarkas and his family, who live in Qardaha.¹⁶⁵



The image above is taken from a Facebook post published on March 6, 2025, with a caption that indicates armed civilians (members of the Na'im tribe) in Dourin, Latakia, gathered in support of government forces.¹⁶⁶ Captured by Syrian Archive on May 18, 2025.

Tribal fighters from western Syria were also present. Local members of the Naim Tribe, spread across Syria, also announced their mobilization, including in the Latakia town of Dourin on March 6,¹⁶⁷ and the western Hama towns of Maarzaf and Jalmeh on March 7.¹⁶⁸ Baggara tribesmen from southwest Idlib were killed during the fighting, based on communal 'martyrdom' reports, though it is not clear if these men were killed while serving in the General Security or army units in the coast already, or if they arrived as reinforcements deployed after March 6.¹⁶⁹



Appendix A: Geolocations

Figure 1

26th Division / Maghawir al-Sham Division convoy at 35.120283, 36.739286, in Hama City, March 9.





Figure 2

26th Division / Maghawir al-Sham Division convoy at 35.043040, 36.261054, Resafa countryside, March 8.





Figure 3

Eastern Knights Brigade at 35.47676, 35.89169, Jableh, March 8.






Figure 4

Hamza Division's Eastern Knights Brigade shooting at 35.47064, 35.89702, near Sanobar, March 8.






Figure 5

Hamza Division's Eastern Knights Brigade at 35.45561, 35.90693, March 8.





Figure 6

Suleiman Shah Division at 35.37332, 35.92595, Jableh, March 8.






Figure 7

Ahrar al-Sharqiyah at 35.48692, 35.88016, Sanobar, March 7.






Figure 8

Ahrar al-Sharqiyah shooting at 35.463906, 35.902886, Sanobar, March 8.






Figure 9

21st Division / Sultan Murad Division at 35.363741, 35.938412, in Jableh, March 7.






Figure 10

21st Division / Sultan Murad Division at 35.48724, 35.87997, near Sanobar, March 7.¹⁷⁰






Figure 11

21st Division / Sultan Murad Division at 35.402916, 35.933581, near Hmeimim Airbase, March 7.






Figure 12

Faylaq al-Sham at 35.1846, 35.94774, Baniyas city, March 7.



Figure 13

74th Division / Jaish Izza at 35.004910, 36.276401, near Wadi Ayoun, March 8.






Figure 14

74th Division / Jaish Izza at 35.0036,36.2702, near Wadi Ayoun, March 8.






Figure 15

77th Coastal Division / Brigade at 35.52638, 35.8116, Latakia city, March 7.




Figure 16

77th Coastal Division / Brigade at 35.544617, 35.790733, Latakia city, March 8.





Figure 17

77th Coastal Division / Brigade at 35.55966, 35.78279, Latakia city, March 9.






Figure 18

400th Division members at 35.57487, 35.74386, northwest Latakia city, February 9.






Figure 19

Independent militia, driving towards Salenfeh at 35.59753, 36.12673, March 9.





Figure 20

Bushaban 505 Militia at 34.90209, 35.89898, Tartous city, March 7.






Figure 21

Tribal Militia (Al-Hamd Abed clan and the Al-Bo Sultan clan) eating lunch at 34.87002, 35.8886 in Tartous city, March 7.






Figure 22

Al-Bu Asi clan members driving towards Latakia city on the Jisr Shoughur highway at 35.52036, 35.85305, published on March 8.





Figure 23


Tribal fighters shooting south at 35.45119, 35.90827 towards the Qardaha junction, March 7.





Figure 24

Tribal convoy at 35.58258, 35.94848, near Mukhtariyah, March 7.





ENDNOTES:

- ¹ Maggie Michael, "How Reuters counted the dead in the March killings of Syrian Alawites," Reuters, 30 June 2025, 267fecfcd2a67e67d513cfb72edf0d8870cbdb413ccadac87048cef728e841
- ² cf4a5b2560c29fa6bb03fb1ab7496a80efb91093f967265429c7efc159f81d96;
d75c8f74d71bf626d0aea10e5cd3f1572534771a07b265126ed54a360e3b42fe;
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- ³ d64d35557b685e1ca19b0c889cbaf6f6a523b922aa51c268602b458ecc711693
- ⁴ 8fb67a6aa412827930464227b373ac2a5e7351d26f4b799343524c745fd8552e
- ⁵ d64d35557b685e1ca19b0c889cbaf6f6a523b922aa51c268602b458ecc711693
- ⁶ 17c53450792fcea68415628c243c89c60c05abde0fb8a3d4846564db1d53736
- ⁷ 2c2419e68d49a132adff14359a2265560858f42433bb6f894bf5ee17c4ee74de
- ⁸ 9ee2f5443eff16f21a05bb116e2fa87100be75889f6080c6b61f15c04d6fa3b1
- ⁹ c3c895ceaed62e57b6213e4232a22aa52730c37b7387ee9cea85c35f86aae5ea; see Appendix A Figure 1.
- ¹⁰ 9f00a9ccca282e917325ee43f3b85a29c966ff8239ab4458c772ea1439a8d45d; see Appendix A Figure 2.
- ¹¹ 8b620901b4fc4fd1a0808a2f999be752d38e24e61a9869f73ec00076c92642a9
- ¹² 8a7a6c786b056f292c124ae4dc5eebe599fad804296f4e0d25aa27a5294c6fad
- ¹³ 1e23281dc9bbe266d7f66c4583dd7ffa3df7481796a3abfe61057dcd86da625
- ¹⁴ d64d35557b685e1ca19b0c889cbaf6f6a523b922aa51c268602b458ecc711693
- ¹⁵ 5e983c56c63a257be1490a1d3dd0b154126b3c93f0caf6211e27c1eb0eefc162
- ¹⁶ 9341d3cc58145c351d03d168373b38e09c1a3043635f3ccd8626ae1e2926be62
- ¹⁷ 5045e02beac853c0adee83d2323561dbf27930cd4237ad7acb096f998db7893f
- ¹⁸ 7bdd61cc608f40c8d16440d1c70b17a42b9912fe849aa3d13c05000692a0d35d
- ¹⁹ 5e983c56c63a257be1490a1d3dd0b154126b3c93f0caf6211e27c1eb0eefc162;
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- ²⁰ 8b792776658bb6bbea413fb249c2e0edcee3d546c8e9208496274ce1fb7ba3af; see Appendix A Figure 3
- ²¹ beaceb296e1a39225566fd6c4f92beea03429e267d3e8aaf1cb245896a168e78; see Appendix A Figure 4;
accee4da676bef8f0d49dca0bedd926cb95700a67f53338448360893f0edbc9b; see Appendix A Figure 5.
- ²² 62cba881cf8019f4e025a1702a84869a3be7efe8635f2610ab1f526c4831d83a
- ²³ 4b6478f332c89cc8fa25da9bd099af800cabf52e93d5751bb618660a37e0ee47
- ²⁴ f576f2b2937329c993660cd17ea7c4440bb1a0aa0fcb7b26ccb48ac2a714e848
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- ²⁶ 0cd4c973927a7f7259a2b5c8aa9b8c0a2bf88e50a3b2e32299d1020b063c875b (graphic);
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- ²⁷ a3b7443b993accac0b79d4dac440622fd76133f54f2292ea7f52760334b7d8c8; see Appendix A Figure 6.
- ²⁸ aa5dd11b4d46e97b1cf6bbcc807ce492479d8d520fb2e3a209dd00314c4b55edc
- ²⁹ ffb26bfce0b6164b2f52d432d5abf18c7081d39f6fa3d5ec794e54612e7635ed
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- ³¹ 2ec3847ba3449cb53155cc8563601fbf130046d6309a4b92368e4e48ad1dfefa
- ³² 98bd2a445c6ae5538aeecc46799f16c263ac55a2b80636ec1bbc83039589ecc87
- ³³ cffb81eb4f84bddb8c5f5916e53278e449c4f3cd8b088c29beff68b67988c2a1
- ³⁴ a846cb1ce486c257be912568ef99cb0af118fe15d6829b171ae901202a6a0b4a
- ³⁵ 10260b507c69939299a1d015ef023831ba899b66f076cd5a901c4490fd86cc38
- ³⁶ 63c6bb300f7e11bbe36da62ebf34cae5f45a2e156c59204e7284aa48df5ac74a
- ³⁷ 1084187406ee2d0a27bf7d6c565f28a8b15ea5de8c91e2b047d0458f3c0f4f6f
- ³⁸ 6dbf876f7181d12e07a73963a56a2f67dd853960f5963a92e63dd8fa8da22050;
2e3e23ac263dd718cfd43088b54a0837a534acd72a30eb0d2c23211645592939; see Appendix A Figure 7.
- ³⁹ db445114ba20802c34b87f7ed96d7d5613d680316201b7eaf9146520f2abf949
- ⁴⁰ be2cbf080fb4440f73d4a5e381bc356f76bf48917843f0fe26e5d3fdd7417f37
- ⁴¹ 5b3161d88f6f05e52ce6e64d5bfd9884d7b884425594a5b4402a8ac1854ce363
- ⁴² 63c6bb300f7e11bbe36da62ebf34cae5f45a2e156c59204e7284aa48df5ac74a
- ⁴³ see appendix A Figure 8.



44 e832e25c2bcab3868dcc0284cbd4d959fed34cbd7b46418e73c4602b18813bb
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46 80df1079e9068200184bf065d2e4e45ae02817c2f9eec2c29664818b16157888
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Figure 10.
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61 a461cb630d1b5e3ef20bf3387230cde4a32810fdb8a171011b3fea4ac7cb3deb
62 The NLF is described in a Crisis Group report as a group of Turkish-backed factions operating in Idlib,
as opposed to those Turkish-backed factions which operate in north Aleppo outside of HTS controlled
territory: “Containing Transnational Jihadists in Syria’s North West,” International Crisis Group, 7 March
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a85c6afae656affb5f71d5efc23a4d839262230ffce5f163ebabd9c82814dc28
64 d3d4448513fa333f263c7721e9d0a4ef4291ac67f581ed33c1fa5813b7c141c1
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68 bed4959fcd7bf668ad23e2b0a55327351961fa29a3423886ee97e046d45778af;
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69 1782c867b4340b2cac041987c6c842ea52c0c7c6ef91f8ec47eeeb1f918e4c3c
70 99561663facbb93d95c87d29c45740ccf5e58eeab699747ded9029368861189; see Appendix A Figure 12.
71 48e85b69efd7433db8b39fdbbc2d365136751283d013f5777391c0bc861cfb56
72 59c714d41f1459599b4693f242eaec1cf232fb3187b1db7e0efc4d82cedf4437
73 626c5ee9d832fec4b635bfb76884b921cf3994a50c09bdafae9e775649bf1ac6;
33169bab4687273b49663a372e2d7514c73d5d79b060e0217c077be6445fffb7;
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74 626c5ee9d832fec4b635bfb76884b921cf3994a50c09bdafae9e775649bf1ac6;
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75 33169bab4687273b49663a372e2d7514c73d5d79b060e0217c077be6445fffb7
76 626c5ee9d832fec4b635bfb76884b921cf3994a50c09bdafae9e775649bf1ac6



77 626c5ee9d832fec4b635bfb76884b921cf3994a50c09bdafae9e775649bf1ac6
78 47313916f136ac58645a62fec9511de3624615cfa573fe68afada88205ddd67e
79 f64982e15d718ad119eb887f677c5a4b503d3a42a9f200efd3faf85be257a0a9
80 4a00b04c3943c12d0bb69ff49c5a4eb86003bb6617f01bd23a899c1aa55c631e (graphic)
81 2b7662948bb47442a9f969f4bde7f2f31e28b0c70c8fa3f3c2cbca20df667cf6
82 47313916f136ac58645a62fec9511de3624615cfa573fe68afada88205ddd67e; see Appendix A Figure 13.
83 fd669294d5f5d881370e5d026da2ca26edd669f6716f08338b0109b230451e7c;
d17df6134d2a937e59004ff2a598e69ba60443f3cd82dfb7104ffbf63e241241; see Appendix A Figure 14.
84 8cf8a0b30ca8586692a52215ad8e6ee4936226562e8321e64161d8526791cb8e
85 33169bab4687273b49663a372e2d7514c73d5d79b060e0217c077be6445fff7
86 5f78d0f58cd88675ce536b47202d5cb67a11fddac39c991ec577ebcdd034a410
87 eb3f2a181b752214082c6528269925e3c707ae666b9dfce2af89973ac9477448
88 e4843a44c52f97351ee39fba0b80e30edc0f7c33770545cd1ad35e97668adfe1
89 f6590349395ede070ae28401b82097640f3e445b437a34992f91ed1869d07c47
90 392057e6805921124cf06da7e76d19cd4e8500b93807ecd0a1a3b11b5ad57880
91 e4843a44c52f97351ee39fba0b80e30edc0f7c33770545cd1ad35e97668adfe1;
3b477a7ef3765cab9ea7d4af937157fdd18b61d37b84026c09c6aa09959a6e91; see Appendix A Figure 15.
92 d5367528a66d17e85a713ce615983b8066961c2c2a1eaafd3aba3eb31d6e9e66; see Appendix A Figure 16.
93 ceacd121f3efcf5c416f30496d47c657f0eb2c0bcb45887234e15eb2cde428fc; see Appendix A Figure 17.
94 97e746e9c39f1147211d3c3d70f54b68fad292837d3f6be4d72cbc9eca84ed30
95 cc441004b149c9497c4ad72993f3cbfb81113a0ca0d0ecb9a479bb32674567d7
96 105f0f8fc2255238cfde7c1fff6b33513c51973f2073956e599c862e28a9f0dc
97 03d3fd70d7b799dddec3a8d5c3e56eb18008514c7f2fb797c75fad75a98316756
98 bb7da7a190ba47eb6a41e0c76c8356528228f387a02d3171879733d44fac7d0c
99 a58e4c7eb277a5cdb86100b316a27049f269eb9968f414e4896af7c400b4baf9
100 071a5e6519df95003efb636f7c496aa0e79cb6ae659dfa63d3cf1f8692ad65fe
101 5f78d0f58cd88675ce536b47202d5cb67a11fddac39c991ec577ebcdd034a410
102 2ec990efac90b3293313a59274d6c8c0bdfb5990f35b090c57fc0b424bb007ea;
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103 f9d99f70e04e0e517ca1ea419356b67108db917c80e89f7b09d97efa8d5fdd64
104 a2e33785b96913e9be4016545c85e8530c84d90055ebc1dae94c1bed5189aa3c
105 735847b985e0986bbe9bd955eee02a74ab0e5e0fe2c45935b004d1d9a0c3934e
106 0f83fab8ec6ee963e7d617f81bf301541f22654db1854ef065b01f0cf18c7807
107 a61f85de14de9cd0ae4594d3fe213c57a692be0443caa8f0bee21aecd159816a
108 fe3b5acc0ec7f6a681109b18447e9ddc33d353aa97c4ed517d1e85aed26f42fe
109 fc90984f808de6873a6d204eccc4821dc1a1675b029ede1381e3f34bcd5e7622
110 f4ccca6e4a53ab71aca7ec917c0ef1f0f0d5fd182f260417eb69e3003ffe94;
87798b2e30746d478c21020b9bb2513e024a4217f0c8b2abcb6fac614ea7ebb8
111 d4a2ada474cff22984f0f3d6685c6023acb7ad8f713c9117a7850c57a1f2f9ed
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113 c45e7ba2bef3fec9a0b95a652021430a663f051726a57ea4330b5e4b44db3d00
114 5ee4ddb7cfaa869828d3d4994e7b85300115c8da23ee77978923067f35855196
115 9ca482abd8de0c4d5599451a6784660e7f45404ecb57979f603deb0b8755106e;
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116 ac8f2a6c78fadafe249b64831a42e1cfb8212daa7c09a8625c858224e9d5c6d1
117 2c3b7e010e38752aaf59b68899b606a27ae8ed1086baa213dbd6b7248af76195
118 80e90c56a74647d508b0f3936d1ac4e5bd371e080e1534bc4191cb227e7fb7d9
119 282675f28bc445e8781036800f9577772d416a4485ec8988fa379e50f080f023
120 386f1b9c891270612b2e3ba2a06eec5a2f715f3b62b653126ae6eeca39c7c2b2
121 e0d865e42c2ee8c0eb48b47a0728250001bead4b80dc1cfe128dddec1019afb87
122 94739813749e20ee0bde035c43c06f98d8a80e006757f5f8f3a45038841765a3



123 8e2f0aaf9f300547874cda0531f03dada010a5bb5fd0abce49c4cc1c738c4545
124 f960cc9bc1e7a8fa65936c9ee8fb85ae139fd718f06655a32a8a698a01895fa9
125 40a11d1e0bbd58cbc019343ee236b31ab808fb2866889f3c990db734ad026a30
126 081bd630c5c1039b177dc86a8f34c358304afd29adf67327911765d294df283a
127 80e90c56a74647d508b0f3936d1ac4e5bd371e080e1534bc4191cb227e7fb7d9
128 2792728fddb3c1b782faa868945e8f87a6dcc7e4b22852b3a5efeb9abe24f18a
129 de0a7c15ead82947f5c8d299da2ebe48b018e77fa1baff8e3873116b382d1477; see Appendix A Figure 18.
130 2792728fddb3c1b782faa868945e8f87a6dcc7e4b22852b3a5efeb9abe24f18a
131 63c11400b1abe75d51406c557b3eaaba40827647e12976c09e44884d0abdf2fb
132 90801e0ca52e6cd48420c47a08b62830e779479e5aaed9725703b9e2ea8b735d
133 8bd5429b784e270d928c8b40e11ae0b96e17001a96d88f571b4b6de323f2b57d
134 14b4146cfe1038c075041f60b80563b40821bba130fb50b5b86296f9f1210bbc
135 3b34156e6cfd255512a72c8f6f654332ee8e2a14de11edbb792b0125bfc5e08f (graphic)
136 bbec69c4d28d5bed5f70a86fd53842ef9afdcc776979e5b6ec570fd6392b5a51
137 dcbceaaf710580cb4f9c0deaba17fbe8513c44ebf070813f8927553f7b654a67
138 0fed98c3318ae433e82d3a02eb94f531159990287c4d47b3ef6773b8db550ab5
139 c11c6f3c0e106786eb07d0d1783b7db3d01a0e665c2490a6b9fe054dc64683c7
140 94dc03cb0a3621e3914966008aa4ac5f8692574213cb95ff7603a116e2b4161a
141 ee20373ae47de992970f36713b8abdfab7ac0021561e2ac01010cd66b34a19d7
142 94fe5f36ae6f2d5025e146cce3fe0817917abbe35bfecd0fae9d1421e5204d07; see Appendix A Figure 19.
143 45fc77569c7c46e1b733b7e09ca18f188ca923212c3fc2d4f83050c25b340feb;
56d901f0c98e2cbf011fe517af8513d963592bdfed86893b8b327f589d967cdf
144 45fc77569c7c46e1b733b7e09ca18f188ca923212c3fc2d4f83050c25b340feb
145 56d901f0c98e2cbf011fe517af8513d963592bdfed86893b8b327f589d967cdf
146 b05735c759a6103866e963f91947b90ea42b7440e7daec999fee8b6a0e5069b7
147 77c67a038558198edcfacada5bfc4ef6bd6c54d357882fe49d84e1d64d763a3c
148 77c67a038558198edcfacada5bfc4ef6bd6c54d357882fe49d84e1d64d763a3c
149 bd4e4c04bfc6c4dad0f01168284b5dc6b07431386653ee77053bd42c1a13da97
150 e6c9a1dd7a6746bdd82e2743235a254c6fdae3bcb18e5636bcb83be64679a
151 c7b085b70e71b5a0f9ab80970b2af7eed4df3623956628014962aafc3074d7c1;
44e8ddfb002a429d6f7f6cb15af3b782bbbe0839dda46c119ff9da6cd4afa431
152 9fc6b0d95c315e31ae09353f05b8ca457f18924fccbe6f4c92fbffce517aefeb (graphic)
153 4807346d5327895c828daf99d3cc4ed3f8270c2be9589ed8da4c33673e3f3d60;
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154 fbba96bd60607b148e2a64bc91dee35ea27dcd9fba1bc0269e8f6c25a280d16e;
236227a0680a9db04767a7f7c61d4bb7e100bd94096b09f01d5fcd4a07b4deac
155 b3cc1d8e6aea8d4b01c8534890c3a2f5aec3b3df2806be5425ecfe1caf8ab116
156 dfdd1a376f9db22fb4d56802e88cf908bc76aeeee04b40677e5a05b462b7c757
157 e832e25c2bcab3868dcc0284cbd4d959fed34cbd7b46418e73c4602b18813bb
158 e86b82f2e7650a2971602ebd897fbbfcbfada30a591c6cd89b3ee7238e10d9eb; see Appendix A Figure 20;
1d97377d0301d4a5cc87140c436ea9b552912c2ce7100a0058297de01db46148; while the post claims to
show fighters in Qardaha, it has been geolocated to 34.87002, 35.8886 on the southern outskirts of
Tartous city; see Appendix A Figure 21.
159 dfdd1a376f9db22fb4d56802e88cf908bc76aeeee04b40677e5a05b462b7c757; see Appendix A Figure 22
160 8cddae9f8e953e8a558601badc8fdb396c8cd3947019ef0b27d9f32f2bf5e1bd
161 236227a0680a9db04767a7f7c61d4bb7e100bd94096b09f01d5fcd4a07b4deac; see Appendix A Figure 23
162 fbba96bd60607b148e2a64bc91dee35ea27dcd9fba1bc0269e8f6c25a280d16e; see Appendix A Figure 24
163 fca2eb2d0911e4cb60e7933e5768fb79b11b1b3fab2ad922ef368de25466ee34
164 1bcd3b97b2f4fb8a5eadf6a5a08ee63027636c4bd803918bc0c7447f9c299411
165 72118968d7deaf8972aa376bbf7bb66cd7df67dd3cb996d76ede534125e2b4f8
166 b36736de5fcfd15ddb23f007946019c059fb7e986795ce4e09a1de9602dc0e83



¹⁶⁷ b36736de5fcfd15ddb23f007946019c059fb7e986795ce4e09a1de9602dc0e83
¹⁶⁸ 7cdc9ae7876d44a851bfb2fd836cdad96c5ca43d22e0cfcbad57cba854ea86f3
¹⁶⁹ e6c9a1dd7a6746bdd82e2743235a254c6fdaeadd3bcb18e5636bcbcb83be64679a
¹⁷⁰ c15ca84b25feb395758c047472263b70698cb6df313f98bb4b14b103463d5930